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BONOGOFSKI DECISION REVERSED. 
ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST CONSTITUTES DETENTION BUT 
COMPLIANCE WITH S. 10 CHARTER MAY BE BRIEFLY DELAYED 
Regina v. BONIN 
B.C. Court of Appeal - No. CA 008998 January 31, 1989 
The Courts of Appeal usually sit with three justices. On very rare 
occasions five members will make up the Court, as the B.C. Court of Appeal 
did in this case. The reason was that the Crown applied for the Court to 
reverse its own decision of November 18 of 1987*. It held then that 
conducting a roadside sobriety test to determine justification for a 
demand for breath samples constitutes detention of the suspect and 
triggers his/her right to counsel. Apparent unawareness of this decision 
has caused numerous B.C. drinking-driving cases to bite the dust. 
When the officer stopped the accused for a blatent traffic offence (prior 
to the Bonogofski decision) he made him perform some physical tests which 
convinced the officer that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by 
alcohol. He then made a demand for breathsamples followed by his charter 
right to counsel and right to remain silent. Breathsamples were analyzed 
and the accused was released. Not at any time during this investigation 
did the accused ask for or was given the opportunity to phone a lawyer. 
The accused's trial took place prior to the Court of Appeal's Bonogofski 
decision, and he was convicted of "over 08." Consequently, he appealed to 
the B.C. Court of Appeal to have that conviction quashed or reversed. 
The Crown seized this opportunity to question the legal correctness of the 
Bonogofski decision or at least remove some confusion that seems to exist 
about that decision. 
The Court of Appeal placed some weight on the fact that the section of the 
Criminal Code providing for a roadside breath test is not in force in 
B.C. Therefore, methods other than such a test must be used to elevate 
suspicion into reasonable and probable grounds. The roadside sobriety 
test is part of that substitute method. The Court was firm in its opinion 
that a person who performs that test is under detention and entitled to 
counsel. The only way there can be an exception is, under the "section 1 
Charter test." In other words, the Court would have to find that, in the 
circumstances as described above, the right to counsel is limited for the 
purpose of such a test due to it being justified in a free and democratic 
society. However, the limitation must be one prescribed by law. For 
that, it has to be expressly provided by statute or result from the 
operational requirements of the law. Hence, it need not be an explicit 
limitation. The roadside sobriety test is as an operational requirement 
to the "demand" laws something "prescribed by law" and subject to the 
"section 1. test, 11 held the Court. 
*R. v. BONOGOFSKI - B. C. Court of Appeal CC 007055 
See Volume 29 - page l of this publication. 
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Furthermore, s. 214 of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act provides that a peace 
officer may demand that a driver, who he, on reasonable and probable 
grounds, believes is impaired, surrenders his driver's licence. The B.C. 
Interpretations Act states that where the law gives a person the power to 
do or enforce something he is deemed to also have been given the power 
necessary to enable that person to do or enforce that thing. Again, this 
adds up to the roadside sobriety test being something prescribed by law. 
Said the Court: 
"In my opinion, the operational requirement of s. 214 
implicitly prescribes the reasonable limit of a brief delay 
in informing the driver of his right to counsel until the 
tests are completed." 
Quoting from reasons for judgment by their Ontario counterparts* on this 
very issue of roadside sobriety tests and right to counsel, the B.C. Court 
of Appeal found the limitation demonstrably justified as: 
11 
• • • the evil of impaired drivers is so great and 
invninent to all who use the highway that I can only 
conclude that a police officer stopping a car under the 
provisions of (s. 147. M.V.A. in B.C.} is empowered to 
require a driver to undertake a coordination test" •••• 
"It must be remembered that the impaired driver may be to 
all who use the highways, an ongoing danger as great as any 
charged and ticking time bomb. 11 •••• "The potential for 
invnediate harm to the public from an impaired driver 
continues as long as he is on the road. The need to test 
the driver in order to either confirm the suspicion or 
dispel it is imperative. The taking of the coordination 
test neither causes any real inconvenience not in itself, 
exposes the driver to a criminal charge. 11 
In terms of an opponent different conclusion in the Bonogofski case, the 
Court explained they were correct in terms of detention, but had now 
reversed their decision in regards to "rights to counsel" based on the 
section 1 (Charter} test. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction of "over 08 11 upheld . 
*R. v. SAUNDERS (1988} 63 C.R. (3d) 37. 
* * * * * 
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PICKETING A COURTHOUSE 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT Of THE COURT 
Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v. Attorney General of 
Newfoundland, et al 
Supreme Court of Canada - 44 C.C.C. (3d) 186. 
Under the labour laws of Newfoundland, the Public Employees Association 
representing personnel serving the Newfoundland Supreme Court were in a 
legal position to strike and picketed the courthouse. Only some 
supervisory staff were allowed to cross the picket line. 
Mr. C., a bailiff, who executed and served the processes of the Supreme 
Court crossed the picket line and went about his duties, despite the fact 
he was not exempted. The Association, under a provision of its 
constitution commenced disciplinary proceedings against Mr. C. He 
successfully sought an injunction against the Association restraining it 
from continuing those proceedings. The Supreme Court Justice held that 
notwithstanding the lawfulness of the strike, inducing Mr. C. from his 
duties constituted criminal contempt of the Court because it interfered 
with the administration of justice. In other words, the labour laws and 
the Association's constitution had been superseded by the criminal law. 
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal upheld the views of the Supreme Court and 
the dispute ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized in its reasons for judgment that it 
did not order anyone back to work nor did it intend to decide if Mr. C. 
was obliged to report for his duties despite the strike. The Court simply 
had two issues to decide on: 
1. Does picketing a Courthouse in the course of a lawful strike 
constitute criminal contempt of the Court? 
2. Does the Association in these circumstances have the lawful right 
to proceed with a disciplinary hearing against Mr. C? 
The Court was unanimous that a picket line {regardless of its lawfulness 
under the labour laws) intended as a barrier to a courthouse, constitutes 
a crimina l contempt of the court. The courts are the only focusses that 
can effectively defend and protest the rights and freedoms of all citizens 
and adjudicate on civil and criminal disputes. Any action to impede 
access to the Court is contrary to the rule of law and amounts to criminal 
contempt of those courts. The rule of law is enshrined in our 
Constitution and is fundamental to our justice system. This can only be 
maintained if access to our Courts is unimpeded and uninhibited, reasoned 
the Court. It recognized the right of the Union to enforce solidarity and 
demand from its members (and expect from others) respect for its lawful 
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picket lines. However, in view of the criminal contempt such a line 
amounts to at a courthouse, the Union cannot exercise its disciplinary 
authority to enforce respect for a picket line which in itself is 
unlawful. Only in the absence of illegality had the Union a right to 
discipline Mr. C. 
In view of the Court stipulating that only a picket line intended as a 
barrier to a courthouse amounts to criminal contempt, the Association 
pointed out the absence of evidence that the picketers had interfered with 
anyone or had interrupted any court proceedings. Their behaviour had been 
peaceful and free of any threats of coercion or violence. However, the 
Court observed that the very purpose of a labour picket line is to 
11 discourage and dissuade 11 persons from crossing that line. By its very 
nature, a picket line "has great powers of influence as a form of 
coercion. 11 It is a symbol of solidarity, a matter of faith and morals 
obliging everyone not to cross it. Accordingly the Court ••• 
dismissed the Association's appeal. 
Note: Concurrent with this judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada 
delivered a consistent judgment regarding a similar dispute 
between the B.C. Government Employees Union and B.C. 1 s Attorney 
Genera 1. 
* * * * * 
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SEARCH OF VEHICLES, BOATS AND PLANES 
VIS-A-VIS SEARCH OF PLACES 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH RESULTING 
IN AN ARREST AND A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHERE THERE ARE GROUNDS 
FOR ARREST THAT IS NOT EFFECTED UNTIL AFTER THE SEARCH (ONTARIO 
Regina v. JONES 
44 C.C.C. (3d) 248 - Ontario Court of Appeal 
Two Ontario police officers were given information by their dispatcher 
that a vehicle of certain description, bearing licence number so and so, 
was proceeding in a certain direction on the same highway they were on in 
their patrol car. This vehicle, according to information received by the 
dispatcher from another police department, had run the border and not 
cleared customs. The vehicle, according to the information received, 
contained contraband American cigarettes. Twenty minutes after receiving 
this information, the officers spotted the vehicle. As description and 
license number did match, the officers pulled the vehicle over and, 
without effecting an arrest, searched it. The vehicle (a van) was full of 
cigarettes. The American driver was then informed of the reason for the 
stop, being that they were investigating an offence under the Customs 
Act. The accused was then told of his rights to counsel and taken to 
police headquarters. The reasons for judgment do not state when exactly 
the accused was arrested, however, it is clear that it was after the 
search. 
The trial judge ruled the evidence of the contraband cigarettes 
inadmissible as a consequence of his view that the search of the van had 
been unreasonable, contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. The reason for his 
views was the lack of reasonable and probable grounds on the part of the 
officers to conduct the search. He held that the "slight" indication by 
the dispatcher that the information relied on to justify the search came 
from another police agency was, at best, "once removed hearsay." The 
trial judge directed himself that an informant simply attesting that he 
had received information from a reliable informer, is insufficient for a justice to issue a search warrant. Such information must contain 
sufficient detail and evidence that the informer was in the know and not just gossiping. If that is so, reasoned the trial judge, then how much 
more are we to demand such safeguards to justify a warrantless search. 
The exclusion of the evidence resulted in an acquittal. The Crown 
appealed. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal firstly made a distinction between searches of 
homes or real property vis-a-vis that of cars, airplanes or boats. These 
means of transport move quickly and consequently warrantless searches 
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based on reasonable grounds that they contain contraband are not 
necessarily unreasonable or unlawful. In such circumstances, the hearsay 
information of a reliable source or a fellow officer does not exclude it 
from amounting to prerequisite grounds for a search. The leading Canadian 
cases dealing with warrantless searches are not in relation to means of 
transport. But, in the U.S., exceptions to their reasonable search 
provisions have been created by precedents for warrantless searches of 
such means of transport. In one case, the Ontario Court of Appeal applied 
the U.S. approach* but the trial judge had considered that case to be 
distinct from this one. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged all the precedents regarding 
"information received" and its inadequacy without anymore to justify the 
issuance of a warrant, effecting an arrest or conducting a warrantless 
search. Sometimes such information amounts to no more than 11 conclusionary 
statements" by someone. It must be ensured that no warrant does issue, 
arrest is made or search conducted on what may be information amounting to 
some quantum leap from gossip to a conclusion. In this case, the officers 
received detailed information including a detailed description of the 
vehicle and the contraband it carried. In addition, they were informed 
where the cigarettes were loaded and what offence had been committed at 
the border crossing. All of this information had come from another police 
agency. 
"Such details ••• constituted reasonable grounds to justify a warrantless search" 
concluded the Ontario Court of Appeal. It was not just some instruction 
to "stop and search" without any further information. In this case, the 
officers were duty bound to do what they did. 
Furthermore, the search 11 was authorized as an incident to a valid arrest, 
even though the respondent (the accused) was not arrested until after the 
search" reasoned the Court of Appeal. It is well established law that a 
valid arrest authorizes searching the detainee and his vehicle. However, 
where a search precedes and produces the grounds for arrest, the 
unreasonableness of the former may invalidate the latter. In this case, 
if the officers had effected the arrest prior to the search, the arrest 
would have been valid considering the information they had received. In 
this case, if the officers had effected the arrest prior to the search, 
the arrest would have been valid considering the information they had 
received. In other words, what the officers found by means of the search 
only supplemented the already existing grounds for effecting an arrest. 
Consequently, the reasonable and probable grounds the officers had to 
effect a legal arrest at the time they stopped the accused made the search 
incident to that valid but uneffected arrest. Quoting from U.S. 
Jurisprudence, the Ontario Court of Appeal held: 
*R. v. DEBOT (1986)30 C.C.C. (3d)207 
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11 
• • • if the officer is entitled to make an arrest on the 
basis of information available to him before he searches, 
and as an incident to that arrest is entitled to make a 
reasonable search of the person arrested and the place 
where he is arrested, there is nothing unreasonable in this 
conduct if he makes the search before instead of after the 
arrest. 11 
In fact, the Court found that it may be to a suspect•s advantage and be 
fairer to him, if the search precedes the arrest. The search may well 
establish the suspect•s innocence while, in terms of the invasion on him, 
the search before is equal to a search after an arrest. It follows that 
an arrest and a search are more traumatic than a search alone. Another 
issue the Court mentioned to give support to their views is that some 
police officers (particularly prior to the Bail Reform Act) were and are 
of the erroneous belief that once an arrest has been made, they have no 
power to undo it or release the arrested person. This may be so when the 
arrest is made by means of a warrant, but not when the arrest is a 
warrantless one. Since 1971, (and pior to that at corrmon law) the officer 
may release his prisoner unconditionally; particularly, where the grounds 
he had to effect the arrest found to be unfounded. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal reasoned, that even if the search was 
technically unreasonable, there still was no basis to exclude the evidence 
of the contraband. 
Said the Court: 
"In the circumstances of this case, the arresting officers 
had no choice, but, in response to the detailed information 
which was supplied to them, to carry out the order given to 
them. They were not acting in an arbitrary or highhanded 
manner and were acting in good faith. 11 
Thus, even if we are wrong in our findings that the search was reasonable, 
admitting the evidence in the circumstances would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute, is what the Court of Appeal in 
essence said as a finale to their reasons for judgment. 
Crown's appeal allowed; new trial 
ordered 
Note: The Court of Appeal said that the officers had no choice but "to 
carry out the order given to them. 11 These words may to some be 
misleading. Please do not interpret this to mean that the 
officers were justified to stop, search and arrest, because they 
received an order to do so. The case clearly indicates it was 
the detailed information upon which the order was based and that 
that information was given to the officers, that justified their 
actions as peace officers and free agents. 
* * * * * 
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OFFICER ' S SIGNATURE ON TRAFFIC VIOLATION REPORT. 
IS A SQUIGGLE THE EQUIVALENT OF A SIGNATURE? 
Regina v. BROOKS 
County Court of Vancouver -
No. CC 881777 - March 1989 
Mr. Brooks was issued a Traffic Violation Report. In the space for the 
officer's signature was an illegible dash mark. Mr. Brooks unsuccessfully 
disputed the allegation and appealed to the County Court. 
Mr. Brooks argued that as the Traffic Violation Report conrnenced process 
against him, the prescribed procedures must be strictly adhered to. He 
submitted that a signature must be capable of being identified by a third 
party. The mere dash, mark or squiggle the officer placed in the space 
for his signature did not amount to a signature. The B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act provisions are clear and specific and require the officer to "complete 
and sign" the report. The fact that the officer during the dispute 
proceedings identified the mark he made as being his did not remedy the 
procedural omission, submitted Mr. Brooks 
The County Court Judge held that no inequity or prejudice had been invoked 
by the mark not being legible. The document informed Mr. Brooks 
adequately what was alleged and had not disadvantaged him in making a full 
answer and defence. The officer had identified the mark as being his and 
in law that amounts to a signature. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
Note: The officer had explained that he always made the same mark on 
traffic tickets and that the illegibility was deliberate to 
prevent calls to his home. The County Court Judge included the 
explanation in his reasons for judgment but seemed not to attach 
too much weight to this explanation. The matter was decided 
strictly on law alone. The definition of 11 signature 11 and 
"signed" from Black 1 s l aw dictionary was quite weighty. It is as 
follows: 
"The act of putting one's name at the end of an 
instrument to attest its validity; ••• and whatever 
mark, symbol, or device one may choose to employ as 
representative of himself is sufficient." 
"Signed. Includes any symbol executed or adopted by a 
party with present intention to authenticate a writing. " 
* * * * * 
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VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT 
- REASONABLENESS OF WARRANTLESS SEARCH -
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE SEIZED 
Regina v. WARNICK and POTTER 
County Court of Kootenay - January 1989, Cranbrook Registry 130627 
A police officer swore an Information to the effect that he had it from a 
reliable source that the accused was in possession of marihuana and was 
selling it. The cache was in the accused's bedroom the informer said. 
The officer did not know the accused, and the only thing he did to verify 
the tip was to assure himself of the accused's address. There was no 
surveillance, no description of the accused, or a layout of the house to 
determine where the bedroom was. In the past, the informer had given 
accurate information and the the officer therefore considered his source 
to be reliable. All the verifications defence counsel suggested to be 
prerequisite to the source being reliable were according to the officer 
impractical. He simply did not have the manpower, and secondly, 
11 
••• there is always an urgency to these kind of investigations. 11 He 
testified that 11 • • • people tend to move narcotics around rapidly 11 
making it likely that the contraband won't be found where the infor~er 
said it was. 
Two questions defence counsel asked of the officer remained unanswered, as 
the answers may identify the informer. The questions \'lere: 11 Did the 
informer tell you that he personally knew Brent Potter" (the accused), and 
11 
••• did you ask the inforri1er how he knew that Brent Potter either had 
or was selling marihuana from this house. 11 
Other than the name of the informer, the officer testified that he had not 
held back any information from the justice who had issued the search 
warrant. 
The question was whether the officer, without relating that the tip he 
received reflected personal knowledge on the part of the informer, was 
sufficient to satisfy the justice that the officer had reasonable and 
probable ground. If a 11 was rev ea 1 ed except the name of the inf orner, 
lack of mention in theinformat ion that the inforr:ier had persona 1 
knowledge that the accused trafficked in marihuana leads ·to the inevitable 
conclusion that he did not have such knowledge. Consequently, the 
informer was not a reliable source, argued defence counsel. 
The County Court trial judge agreed that personal knowledge on the part of 
the informer was of considerable weight. The judge did conclude that the 
officer was in error when he said that the justice was given all 
information he had at the time of S\1earing the Information for the search 
warrant. However, he attached no deviousness to this, and said: 
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"There is nothing in any of the evidence before ~e to 
suggest that this was from-anything other than 
inadvertence, or a belief that reference to the bona fides 
of an informer need not o further than a statement of the 
informant's reliability in the past if that is so and an 
expression of the belief i~ the truth and correctness of 
the information received . " 
(Emphasis is mine) 
Nonetheless, considering the evidence, the officer did not ask the 
informer the crucial questions. A vague reply or a firm one of personal 
knowledge are the extremities of the spectrum of credibility, a key factor 
in considering reliability. 
The trial judge was not suggesting that the Information must contain 
anything that would lead to the identity of the informer. Mention that 
pertinent questioning or corroborative facts had verified the informer's 
reliability would, in addition to previous experience with the informer, 
suffice. In this case, the trial judge could not conclude that no · 
pertinent questions were asked and that independent investigation had not 
taken place. The warrant had been issued based on first blush belief of 
what the informer said. That should have been the beginning and not the 
end of the police investigation, particularly where circumstances do not 
indicate time constraints. It was the officer's duty to inform the 
Justice of the Peace if he had verified the information received and it 
was incumbent on the justice to ask for such further information to be 
properly "satisfied" of the grounds prerequisite to issuing the warrant. 
In this case, lack of inclusion of verification evidence or questioning of 
the informer to determine reliability and veracity of information in the 
Information, was fatal to its (Information's) sufficiency. 
"Credibility-based probability" is the basis of the Justice's authority to 
issue the judicial licence to search someone's home. Singular reliance on 
the informer's past performance is inadequate to find such probability. 
Consequently, the warrant was invalid, and the search of the accused's 
home was warrantless. No matter how reasonable the officers were, or 
their sincere belief in the validity of the document they executed, their 
good faith cannot transform an illegal search into a reasonable one. 
Although unlawful search can be reasonable, they are not synonimous where 
the "illegality is one of substance." Despite the trial judge's personal 
belief that the officer had been careful and had asked all the necessary 
questions (it simply was not before him in evidence) and that the officer 
sincerely believed that attesting to the informer's past reliable 
performance was all that was needed, the illegality was nonetheless one of 
substance. Consequently, the warrantless search was unreasonable and the 
accused's Charter right not to be subject to such a search was infringed. 
This left the last condition of the exclusionary rule to be considered: 
"Could admitting the evidence, despite the Charter infringement, bring 
disrepute on the Administration of Justice?" 
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The conduct of the police irrespective of the Charter violation, had not 
been flagrant, careless, malicious or in deliberate defiance of the 
accused's rights. The evidence was real and not 1 self-eminating 1 and 
existed regardless of infringement. Admitting it did, therefore, not 
cause the trial to be unfair. Considering all these facts and all the 
binding decisions by superior courts on this issue, excluding the evidence 
would be more harmful to the reputation of the administration than 
including it. 
Narcotics and all paraphernalia 
relevant to "trafficking" admitted 
into evidence 
* * * * * 
GENEST v. The Queen 
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UNREASONABLE SEARCH -
EXCESSIVENESS - EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Supreme Court of Canada - January 26, 1989 
Mr. Genest took up residence in a town after serving time for possession 
of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking. There was i11111ediately at his 
residence, great deal of coming and going. Many of those who called on 
Genest, were motorcycle types. After a few weeks, the local police 
received information from a party they arrested for "break and enter" that 
Genest had stolen property in his home. There were also warrants 
outstanding for Genest for unrelated offences. Armed with a search 
warrant, the arrest warrants, and a battering ram, approximately 20 police 
personnel (in as many cars) attended at the Genest home. Apparently, 
those personnel were from various police departments. In approximately 30 
seconds, the bolted door to Genest's home was opened with the battering 
ram. None of the officers could remember anyone announcing their presence 
or trying another means of gaining access. The sto len goods mentioned in 
the warrant were not found. The arrest warrant was executed and Genest 
was released on bail. 
Approximately a month later, a similar incident took place when police 
searched the Genest home for drugs. Several police services were 
represented and the door was broken open without any advanced warning. No 
drugs were found but two prohibited and one restricted weapons were 
seized. The informer for this warrant had been the same person as the one 
who provided the information for the previous search warrant. 
Although all this sounds quite bizarre, there are some explanations. 
Genest had "Hell's Angels" connections and the evening before the last 
search, there had been a considerable gathering of the 'congregation• at 
the Genest home. This fact coupled with the informer's version of things 
made police decide that this was the time to hit the home. The aggression 
by police on the first search, at least, had also been linked somehow with 
Genest keeping two Pitbulls and two Rottweilers in his home. The accused 
testified at his trial for the weapon charges and explained that the 
excessive traffic at his home was from hosting and billeting "Hell's 
Angels Brothers" who visited from Vancouver and other places. His 
cross-examination revealed a lengthy criminal record including crimes of 
violence. 
The Genest appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was exclusively on the 
validity of the search warrants and the reasonableness of the search. 
Nutshelling the evidence surrounding the search warrant, the Court found 
that it had been issued on some unspecified background information. The 
- 13 -
sole purpose of the search was to find drugs and for this a 11 snall arr.iy 11 
of police personnel tore the door out of its frame and crashed into the 
home without any warning or announcement. Furthermore, the warrant was 
aquestionable document as it was guess work to discover under what Act it 
was issued. It named in its content the Food and Drug Act, as well as the 
Narcotics Control Act. However, no officers were named to take charge of 
the search and some wording used would indicate that it was possibly 
issued under the Criminal Code of Canada. 
The Crown conceded to the Supreme Court of Canada that the search was 
unreasonable and in violation of s. 8 of the Charter. This left, as a 
singular issue, whether admitting the evidence would bring disrepute on 
the administration of justice. The Crown urged that the trial judge had 
erred in law by excluding the evidence resulting from the unreasonable 
search as a matter of course without considering whether admitting it 
would adversely reflect on the administration of justice. 
The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that there is no automatic 
exclusion of .evidence upon finding that a Charter right had been 
violated. The Court in addition must find: (1) that the evidence was 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedom; and, 
(2) that admission would bring disrepute on the administration of justice. In 1987*, the Supreme Court of Canada devised a test to 
determine these factors. The test is divided into three groups, each of 
which can justify suppression of evidence: 
1. Fairnessoftrial; 
2. Seriousness of Charter violation; and 
3. Effects of exclusion. 
Fairness of Trial: 
Despite the questionable warrant and the police demeanor in relation to 
the search, the evidence found was real, factual and concrete. It was not 
challenged that the weapons were found in Genest's possession. He had not 
made any statements and did not assist police in locating the weapons. 
Consequently, the evidence did not eminate from the accused and was not 
created by the Charter violation. There simply was no self-crimination 
and therefore admission of this real evidence (the weapons) would not have 
caused an unfair trial. 
Seriousness of Charter Violation: 
A Charter violation can be inadvertent or technical; have been committed 
in good faith or it can be flagrant, bl atant, willful or de l iberate. 
These possibilities cover a wide spectrum. 
*R. V. COLLINS - See Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
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Particularly where "circumstances" (see s. 24(2) Charter} have not 
prevented police from proceeding properly and where the same results could 
have been attained by not infringing a Charter right, the violation is 
likely to be in the latter category. 
Firstly, the warrant was defect and not just from a technical 
perspective. Ignoring Parliamentary directives regarding the search of a 
person's home with a warrant is serious at any time but particularly when 
that document has as many flaws as this one. As a matter of fact, the 
warrant due to errors had been rendered worthless. A warrant under the 
Narcotics Control Act or Food and Drug Act is, for instance, not valid if 
it fails to identify the person responsible for the search. The warrant 
was a form and the essential information spaces were left blank. These 
police errors were, to say the least, advertent and indicate outright 
carelessness. 
The behaviour of the numerous police officers, was not justified by the 
evidence the Crown adduced. Where there is a real threat of violence or 
harm to third parties, rapid action and certain liberties are allowed to 
avoid injury or even loss of evidence. However, in this case, the Crown 
had relied on "after the fact" justifications. There had been no grounds 
for believing that there were weapons in the house and the find had been 
unexpected. 
The breach of s. 8 Charter had been a serious one. All conunon law 
limitations were ignored and justification for it was not demonstrated. 
The two searches had shown a pattern of search power abuse. Consequent ly, 
admitting the evidence of the weapons would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
Effects of Exclusion: 
Without the weapons as evidence, the Crown had no case. The result of 
suppressing this evidence would be an acquittal. The Court reiterated, 
however, that "excluding evidence necessary for a conviction because of a 
minor Charter breach could bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute just as much as admitting evidence obtained from a flagrant, 
intentional breach of a guaranteed right." In this case, the breach was 
not minor or technical and also under this third test, the evidence must 
be excluded. 
Accused ' s appeal allowed 
Acquittal substituted 
for order of new trial 
* * * * * 
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DESPITE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
SELF INDUCED DRUNKENNESS IS NO DEFENCE FOR 
OFFENCES REQUIRING GENERAL INTENT 
QUIN and The Queen, BERNARD and The Queen 
Supreme Court of Canada - January, 1989 
Mr. Quin was very upset that his girlfriend had ended her relationship 
with him. He drank heavily on the evening in question and did, while 
quite drunk and acting out of character, break into the wor:ian 1 s apartment 
and caused bodily harm to her. He had abused her verbally, choked her and 
had hit her over the head with a beer bottle. He had afterwards slashed 
his own throat. Apparently, the injuries sustained by both parties were 
such that after solile treatment, they were discharged from the hospital. 
Quin was convicted of breaking and entering and cor:tilitting the indictab le 
offence of assault causing bodily harm. He appealed his conviction for 
want of criminal intent due to self-induced intoxication. 
Mr. Bernard had the 18 year-old daughter of a late friend visiting at hi s 
apartment to talk about her father. Bernard did force the girl to have 
sexual intercourse with him. When she resisted, he punched her twice in 
the face with a closed fist, causing her bodily harm. He had also 
threatened to kill her if she failed to cooperate. He also was quite 
drunk at the time and admitted to police that he had intercourse with the 
girl but had due to drunkenness not known why he had done what he did. 
"When I realized what I was doing, I got off," he had said in his 
statement. He appealed his conviction of aggravated sexual assault and 
also claimed that drunkenness had not made it possible for him to have 
formed the criminal intent requisite to that crime. 
Between the two cases, an aggregate of seven reasons for judgment were 
written with seven justices participating. In the Quin case, four 
justices concurred in the result of the appeal, that is, that it must be 
dismissed. In Bernard, the split was five to two in favour of dismissing 
the appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada, having the right to reverse its 
own decisions, may well do so in the future on the issues unsolved in 
these appeals. As it stands right now, the status quo was maintained 
that self-induced drunkenness is very limited in erasing the basic eleraent 
of nearly all crir.re, the criminal mind, intent, 1.1ens rea. In 1978, the 
Suprer:ie Court of Canada did establish a major precederit"""on this question. 
There were dissenting views then, and there were views now that that 
precedent should be abandoned. However, the opinion that accepting 
drunkenness as a defence is a legal luxury we cannot afford on this side 
of the pearly gates, carried the day. 
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Nearly a 11 crimina 1 offences must be committed with a criminal intent. If 
there is no such intent, a conviction cannot follow. There is no doubt 
that alcohol will diminish or even remove totally the capability of 
forming an intent. Consequently, if we follow the principle that we are 
not criminally responsible for our unintentional acts or their 
consequences, drunkenness ought to be a defence. However, the protection 
of the public is paramount it was always reasoned, and we cannot afford 
the inevitable exploitation of such a defence. 11 What you cannot do when 
you are sober, you can do with impunity when drunk." Consequently, where 
a person was drunk when he committed a crime, the Crown need not prove 
intent and the lack of intent is withheld from the jury for the purpose of 
determining the requisite mens rea, claim the opponents to our current 
co111non law. But, as related above, the status quo was maintained (for 
now). 
The criminal offences requiring~~ (nearly all) are divided into two 
categories. Many criminal acts are one act of wrong doing. What we 
intended to do in an assault for instance, is connect and hurt. There is 
no other goal or purpose beyond that. Those offences require a "general 
intent. 11 Then, there are offences where the act of wrong-doing is 
co111n1tted with an ulterior intent for the purpose of attaining an 
objective beyond the performance of the wrongful act. Murder is a good 
example of such an offence. If one co111nits an assault with the ulterior 
intent to cause the death of the victim, then to convict the assailant of 
assault only, all we have to do is prove the general or a basic intent. 
However, if the Crown sets out to prove murder, or attempted murder, it 
must prove that there was a specific intent beyond the general intent to 
co111nit the assault. The specific intent, of course, was to reach the 
ultimate objective of the assault, to cause death. 
For the reasons stated above, our Courts have held that self-induced 
intoxication is no defence for crimes requiring general intent. However, 
intoxication may deprive a person from forming a specific intent. 
Consequently, intoxication is capable of reducing a specific intent 
offence to one requiring a basic or general intent. 
The offences conrnitted by Quin and Bernard require general intent only and 
consequently their .•. 
Appeals were dismissed 
Convictions were upheld 
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Note: What may eventually force our Court to accept drunkenness as a 
defence in general is a basic constitutional matter. A basic 
principle of our criminal law is that without mens rea, there can 
be no criminal liability. The courts have modified this 
principle to protect the public. It can be pursuasively argued 
that the Courts did thereby not create a rule or doctrine but 
formed public policy. The latter is very clearly not the 
function of the judiciary but that of Parliament. The Court must 
adhere to and apply the principles of law. If those principles 
are unrealistic in the real world and contemporary society, then 
limiting those principles to affordable levels is clearly the 
function of the elected representative, who, by the democratic 
process, must make laws reflecting public policy, including 
limitations of principles and rights to protect the public 
interest. In other words, opponents of the common law, as 
explained above, claim that the Court must apply the principle 
that intent is an essential aspect of a criminal act and that, 
hence, drunkenness is a defence. Should we not be able to afford 
this legal luxury, then Parliament through legislation must limit 
the principle. 
* * * * * 
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ASKING QUESTIONS OF A SUSPECT WHO IS NOT DETAINED 
BUT INDICATES HE WANTS TO REMAIN SILENT 
Regina v. HICKS 
Ontario Court of Appeal - 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394 
The accused left a tavern where they refused to serve him any alcoholic 
beverages due to his intoxicated condition. Shortly after he left, a 
young bicycle rider was struck down in the vicinity of the tavern. The 
young man died from the injuries sustained. The motor vehicle left the 
scene of the accident. Three days later, a lawyer phoned the police 
station and gave investigators the location of a van. Upon examination, 
it became apparent that this was the vehicle that struck down the 
cyclist. The accused (the registered owner of the van) attended at the 
police station with his lawyer. He was taken into an interview room, but 
the lawyer preferred to stay outside the room. The accused was informed 
of the investigation and was asked if anyone, other than himself, had 
driven the van on the day of the accident. When he answered, "No," he was 
arrested and given his right to remain silent. 
The accused was acquitted in the District Court of criminal negligence 
causing death, impaired driving, and hit and run. The only thing that put 
the accused behind the wheel of the van at the time of the accident was 
his "No" when asked if anyone but him drove the van that day. It was the 
admissibility of that one word that was the issue of the trial and the 
appeal. 
When the accused was placed in the interview room, he said he did not wish 
to make any statement. Subsequently, the question if anyone else drove 
the van that day was put to the accused. The trial judge held that the 
accused, at the time he entered the room, was no more than a suspect and 
he was not detained. There were no grounds to arrest him until he 
answered the crucial question. Because the accused had left no doubt that 
he did not wish to make any statements, he had exercised his right to 
remain silent. The putting of the question, despite what the accused had 
said, did put the voluntariness of the statement in doubt. The statement 
was excluded because of that as well as the infringement of the accused 
Charter right to remain silent. 
Upon appeal by the Crown, the defence cited a number of cases where it is 
made clear that continuing an interrogation when a person has clearly 
indicated that he wants to remain silent is an infringement of his right 
under s. 7 of the Charter and leads to exclusion of any statement obtained 
thereafter. However, in all those cases, the person questioned was 
detained or arrested. They were more than suspects as police had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe they had committed the crimes 
in relation to which they were questioned. 
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At common law, "police are entitled to question any person, whether 
suspected or not, from whom they think that useful information concerning 
the commission of a crime can be obtained. 11 * The accused was a suspect at 
the time the question was put to him and his assertion not to make any 
statement did not preclude·the asking of further questions, provided the 
person is not detained. The 11 mere asking of further questions without 
oppressive persistence does not affect the voluntariness of the answer and 
does not infringe any constitutional rights. 11 The accused attended 
voluntarily with a lawyer by his side. He was obviously aware of his 
right to remain silent and yet answered the question voluntarily. The 
Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the accused was not 
detained at the time. The statement was admissible. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
*Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v ESPOSITO 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88 (1985). 
* * * * * 
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CUSTOM SEARCHES - DETENTION - REASONABLENESS 
LESSER EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY -
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE AND OTHER SEARCHES 
Regina v. SIMMONS 
Supreme Court of Canada - December, 1988 
Ms. Simmons arrived at the Toronto Airport on a flight from Jamaica. She 
was considered to be nervous and agitated. The Custom officer also 
noticed a bulging around the upper abdomen, and it was decided to 
strip-search her. She was made aware of the sections of the Customs Act 
providing for such a search by bringing to her attention the wording of 
those sections displayed on the wall of the interview-room. She was not 
told of any rights under s. lO(b) of the Charter (right to counsel) and 
told to undress. A quantity of narcotics were found taped on her body 
where the bulging had been noted. She was then arrested for importing a 
narcotic and told of her rights. She inmediately phoned her lawyer. 
The trial judge of an Ontario County Court held that Ms. Simmons was 
detained from the moment she was taken into the search room. She should 
have been made aware of her right to counsel at that time. This could 
have resulted in advice on how she could challenge the need for the search 
under the Customs Act which, if successful, could have meant that the 
narcotics would not have been found. Consequently, he excluded the 
evidence and acquitted Ms. Simmons. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The justices held that 
there had been no detention, not even when the strip search took place. 
They had been guided by U.S. precedents in holding that border searches 
were different from those in criminal investigations and process. For 
Canada to maintain its sovereignty, a restraint for persons entering the 
country is justified and ought to be expected by everyone. The detention 
at a border crossing is, therefore, not included in the "detention" 
referred to in the Charter. However, the Court was not unanimous on this 
point. One justice felt that Ms. Simmons had been detained as intended by 
s. 11 of the Charter. He made distinctions between the levels of 
restraint placed on persons by Customs officers to determine whether they 
are detained. Despite this, he would, like the other justices, have 
admitted the evidence. 
Due to the Ontario Court of Appeal not being unanimous, Ms. Simmons had 
access to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, and she did appeal the 
order for her to be tried again. 
The Supreme Court of Canada found that the United States, with their 
stringent "fourth amendment" that calls for reasonable cause as a 
prerequisite for any search and for warrants, has always in law and juris 
prudence made a clear distinction between border searches and those 
"within natural boundaries." 
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The Canadian Court of last resort reasoned that thousands of travellers 
are detained, in the common understanding of that word, when they enter 
Canada, and may be subjected to these types of border searches. There is 
firstly the routine questions, such as where you have been or what is the 
purpose of your visit to Canada. This may be accompanied by a search of 
baggage "and perhaps a spot or frisk of outerclothing." The second type 
is the skin or strip-search that can be done with the consent of the chief 
customs officer. Thirdlt, there is the body cavity search done by a 
doctor with assistance o X-rays or other technical equipment. 
The first type of search raises no constitutional issues. In other words, 
it does not and cannot amount to detention; consequently, there is no 
obligation to inform of right to counsel; and those searches are 
reasonable. 
The second type of search, when authorized by the Customs Act, does 
constitute detention. A person subjected to such a search is legally and 
physically restrained. There is no alternative but to submit or commit an 
offence. 
Needless to say, the third type of search then also constitutes detention. 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that Ms. Simmons was detained when 
she was strip-searched and should have been informed of her right to 
counsel. 
In 1984*, the Supreme Court had applied s. 8 of the Charter (reasonable 
search) to test the propriety of a search by Combines Investigation 
personnel. It held that authorization for a search was no longer to 
accorrmodate going onto someone's property or to order someone to part with 
certain property but to protect persons and their privacy. The Court 
emphasized that authorization must be issued by a person who is impartial 
and can therefore act judicially and said in the same breath that all 
warrantless searches must be considered unreasonable under the Charter 
unless the Crown proved otherwise. 
The Supreme Court held that the stringent standards they did set for 
searches and seizures in the Hunter v. Southern case could not in their 
entirety apply to Custom searches. Firstly, Canada as a sovereign nation, 
has a right to prevent undesirable persons and goods from entering the 
country. This justifies more intrusive measures particularly where it 
involves drugs or narcotics. Anyone entering a country expects to be 
questioned and have their baggage searched or even being frisked. 
Consequently, there is a much lower expectation of privacy in these 
circumstances. The Court held that such warrantless custom searches of 
baggage and frisking are not unreasonable. This includes "the requirement 
to remove in private such articles and clothing as will permit 
*HUNTER v. SOUTHERN INC. - Volume 18, page 12 of this publication -
[1984] S.C.R. 145. 
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investigation of susp1c1ous bodily bulges. 11 The descretion for the latter 
type search is subject to review upon the request of the suspect. 
Although the chief custom officer who reviews the request may not be 
sufficiently impartial to be acting judicially, the search is nonetheless 
reasonable. 
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the search of 
Ms. Simmons was unreasonable, not because of the type of search, or any 
inappropriate behaviour of the officers, but simply because the search was 
in the third category (as explained above) which constitutes detention and 
the suspect had not been informed of her right to counsel. The Court 
clearly indicated that this right is not only to have the detention 
reviewed but equally to receive legal advice. Ms. Simmons obviously did 
not know her options under the Customs Act, despite the fact that an 
officer pointed at copies of the search sections on the wall. Had she 
phoned competent counsel, all this could have been explained to her. 
Hence, the infringement of her right to counsel did impact on the 
reasonableness of the search. 
The next question, of course, i s whether the two Charter-right 
infringements should cause the evidence of the narcotics found on Simmons 
to be excluded. The Supreme Court reiterated their interpretation of the 
Canadian exclusionary rule, articulated in 1987*. Fairness of the trial 
is the kernel issue. Real evidence that existed irrespective of a Charter 
infringement can rarely, if ever, render a trial unfair. Where a person's 
rights are infringed when he is compelled to incriminate himself (breath 
tests) or where evidence emanates from him (statements) the fairness of 
the trial may be affected in such circumstances. If the infringement was 
committed in good faith, ft will not likely cause an unfair trial and 
disrepute on the administration of justice. 
In this case, the Customs officers had complied with a policy directive 
based on judicial precedents. They had complied with the laws as it was 
at that time. Therefore, they had acted in good faith. Secondly, the 
evidence found was real. Exclusion and suppression of evidence in such 
circumstances would bring disrepute on the administration of justice. 
Simmons' Appeal dismissed 
Order for a new trial upheld 
On the same day that the Simmons judgment was rendered, the Supreme Court 
of Canada also handed down their judgment in Regina v. JACOY 
Jacoy arrived at the Seattle airport, presumably on a national flight. 
Canadian police had him under surveillance as they suspected him of trying 
to import a quantity of cocaine into Canada. He drove from the airport to 
the Canadian border where Customs officers had been alerted and were 
requested to search Jacoy. 
*R. v. COLLINS - Volume 12, Page 1, and Volume 27, Page 1. 
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After the routine questions, Jacoy was taken into a private room and was 
searched by a Custom officer who specialized in detecting drug imports. A 
frisk search (not a strip-search as in Simmons) was conducted and two lots 
of cocaine were found secreted in Jacoy's clothing. He was then placed 
under arrest and told, for the first time, of his rights. When he wanted 
to phone his lawyer, he was told he could do so "at the earliest possible 
convenience." This was not until a good two hours later. Police wanted 
to {and did) firstly complete a search of Jacoy's home. The reactions of 
the B.C. Trial Court and Court of Appeal were similar to that of their 
counterparts in Ontario in Simmons. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that Jacoy was detained when he was 
ushered into the interview room. The officers took control of his 
movements and he had no alternative but to allow the search. At that 
point, he should have been told of his right to council. 
Also, in this case, the Supreme Court held that the officers had acted in 
good faith and in accordance to the law as it then was. Also, the 
evidence was real and exclusion would bring disrepute on the 
administration of justice. 
Jacoy's appeal dismissed 
Order for a new trial was upheld 
Note: Some other cases on these points are: 
R. v. GLADSTONE, Volume 22, page 22 
R. v. RODENBUSH & RODENBUSH, Volume 22, page 20 
R. v. COLLINS, Volume 12, page 1 and Volume 27, page 
R. v. HAMILL, Volume 27, page 10 
* * * * * 
r--
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CATCHING FREE-FLOWING BLOOD 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF ANALYSIS - REASONABLE SEARCH 
The Queen v. DYMENT 
Supreme Court of Canada - December, 1988 
Five days after the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect, Mr. 
Dyment drove his car off the road and suffered head lacerations. There 
were no symptoms of impairment visible on the unconscious man. Before 
suturing the wounds, the doctor caught some of the accused's blood in a 
vial and gave it to the investigating officer. The doctor did not need to 
probe or even touch his patient to get the blood and, of course, he did 
and could not at the time ask him for consent. No demand of any kind was 
made of Dyment; and consequently, he was not required to give a sample of 
any substance of his body (s. 238(3)C.C.). 
The blood was analyzed and consequently Dyment was convicted of "over 80 
mlg." The issue in this case ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Crown submitted that there was no search or seizure; that the taking 
of the blood was not contrary to s. 8 of the Charter; and should it amount 
to an unreasonable search or seizure, admitting the evidence would not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. (No submission was 
made in regard to good faith on the part of the officer.) 
Section 8 of the Charter guarantees us to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. Due to this entrenched supreme law, the emphasis of 
protectTOn from intrusions now include people and their privacy where 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Particularly in our society 
surrounded by and being administered with the assistance of computer 
technology, the dignity and integrity of the individual is threatened as 
"there is privacy in relation to information." We simply had to become 
more alert and prudent if we are to preserve our privacy. This applies to 
search as much as it does to authorities taking information or property 
without the owner's consent (seizure). Information may only be used for 
the purpose for which it was divulged. 
The Supreme Court agreed that in the circumstances, there was no search in 
The Dyment case. However, s. 8 of the Charter does not relate only to 
seizures resulting from searches. In this case, information was seized 
from Dyment's unconscious body. The information, of course, was obtained 
by analyzing the blood. That action had invaded an area of personal 
privacy to the maintenance of Dyment's human dignity. The Supreme Court 
volunteered that even if Dyment had given his consent, then if it was 
restricted to medical use only, seizing the information of blood/alcohol 
level would still have amounted to an unreasonable seizure. The doctor's 
sole objective here was to render medical treatment. Dyment was entrusted 
to him, and catching blood exclusively for the police use was not included 
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in that treatment. The Court went not as far as saying that the doctor 
had breached the trust placed in him, but held that he had no right to do 
what he did; it was unethical the Court implied. Physicians, hospital 
employees, and health care workers must not be part of the "law 
enforcement machinery." 
Mr. Dyment had a reasonable expectation of privacy while undergoing 
medical treatment. He was not "abandoning" his blood when it was taken 
for other than medical purposes. For instance, had spilled blood been 
taken from the car or anywhere it had dropped, there would have been a 
discarding or abandoning and no expectation of privacy. 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded: 
" ••• that in taking the blood sample, the officer 
breached Mr. Dyment's privacy interests in it, and so 
effected a seizure within the meaning of section 8." 
This left the question if the seizure was reasonable. Mr. Dyment's was 
entitled to believe that, when in the hands of a professional medical 
doctor, any substance taken from him is used for medical purposes only. 
It was therefore unreasonable for the officer to ask for an take blood in 
these circumstances. Information from hospitals and doctors cannot be 
revealed to law enforcement agencies other than for compelling 
circumstances of pressing necessity. Although, it all seems logical and 
convenient, the need to protect such information is overwhelming. Quoting 
a justice of the U.S. Courts, our Supreme Court quoted him in agreement: 
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachments by men of zeal, well meaning but without 
understanding." 
The Court went as far as to say that even if the seizure had been lawful, 
it would still be unreasonable. For all the reasons stated above, the 
Court also concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The evidence should be exc l uded. 
Crown ' s appeal dismissed. 
The dissenting reasons for judgment by one justice were pretty strong. He 
held that the police officer did not seize anything. If anyone did, it 
was the doctor without the knowledge of the officer. The officer had 
acted in good faith. The evidence was real and was decisive. He implied 
that the Court was inconsistent with its own previous decisions. (See 
Jacoy, Simmons in this Volume or Collins, referred to in the footnotes.) 
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Coninent: If it was not for the Charter, the actions of the officer would 
have had no effect on the admissibility of evidence. In view of 
the Charter being four days old when this incident took place, 
it seems doubtful that any Court in Canada had made a decision 
based on the Charter. Considering previous decisions on good 
faith, there seems little doubt that it should have been, at 
least, considered. It appears that it applied in this case. 
Furthermore, considering this Court's reasoning in Collins on 
the exclusionary rule (s. 24(2) Charter) there seemed no doubt 
that the evidence of the analysis should have been admitted. It 
is as though the majority of the Court wanted to deal with the 
ethics of the medical profession and come to grips with 
11 information. 11 To say that information was obtained is at best 
indirect. If the blood was properly taken the 11 information 11 of 
the result of the analysis depends on the reliability of the 
analytical procedures or the continuity of the exhibit. 
The Supreme Court of Canada decisions seem indeed inconsistent 
with one another. One hesitates to presume to have the 
competence to make such an observation. However, one of the 
members of that Court is of that opinion. 
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RIGHTS TO COUNSEL - IDENTIFICATION 
PARADE CONDUCTED BEFORE SUSPECTS CONTACTED 
THEIR COUNSEL - COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
LECLAIR and ROSS v. The Queen 
Supreme Court of Canada - January, 1989. (19176). 
Two persons broke into a home at 10:00 P.M. The sound of broken glass was 
heard by neighbors who then unsuccessfully chased the perpetrators. 
About 2 1/2 hours after this incident, police stopped a car with four 
young occupants. At first, the two accused gave fictitious names. A 
search revealed no evidence of any kind, however, three of the four 
occupants of the car were arrested for the break-in and advised of their 
right to counsel. At 2:00 A.M., the two accused attempted to contact the 
lawyers of their choice but received no answer. Leclair declined to phone 
another lawyer, and Ross was not asked if he wanted to. 
At 3:00 A.M., the two accused were brought back from cells and placed in a 
line-up without being told that they were not obligated to participate. 
Apparently, the evidence police gained from this line-up was damaging to 
the accused. The kernel issue of the appeal was whether that evidence 
should be excluded due to the accused's right to counsel having been 
infringed. The Ontario Court of Appeal had held that the accused had been 
afforded a reasonable and effective opportunity to exercise their right to 
counsel and that the line-up evidence was therefore admissible. It was 
from that decision the two accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In 1987*, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to counsel 
imposes on police two duties in addition to making the detainee aware of 
that right. Police must give a reasonable opportunity for the right to be 
exercised, and secondly, police must refrain from attempting to solicit 
evidence from the detainee until there has been such reasonable opportunity 
afforded. In this case, police had failed to co~ply with these duties. 
Both accused had given a clear indication that they wanted to consult 
counsel. The attempt at 2:00 A.M. not being met with success was hardly 
surprising, reasoned the Court. The Court also rejected that Leclair had 
waived his right to counsel by declining to atteMpt another lawyer. He 
said he wanted his lawyer and did not want another one. 11 He merely 
asserted his right to counsel and the counsel of his choice. 11 However, 
the Court said in the same breath that such right must be exercised 
diligently or the duties imposed on police in this regard are suspended. 
Whether such diligence is reasonable depends on the circumstances. Upon 
arrest, a person is perhaps in ill'f!lediate need to receive legal advice. 
When selecting the most competent counsel to represent you at trial, such 
irmiediacy does not exist. Concluded the Court: 
*R. v. MANNINEN - Volume 28, page 1 of thi s publication -
I. R. C. S. 1233. 
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"Nevertheless, accused or detained persons have a right to 
choose their counsel, and it is only when the lawyer chosen 
cannot be available in a reasonable delay that the detainee 
or the accused should be expected to exercise the right to 
counsel by calling another lawyer. " 
Consequently, LeClair had not waived his right to counsel when he declined 
to phone "another lawyer." Furthermore, quoting from a decision the Court 
made in 1986*, the Court said that before it can be said that there is a 
waiver of a right it must be: 
11 
•••• clear and unequivocal that the person is wa1v1ng 
the procedural safeguards and is doing so with full 
knowledge of the rights the procedure was exacted to 
protect and of the effect the waiver will have on those 
rights in the process." 
The Crown failed to show that Leclair had waived his right with such 
awareness and knowledge. In regard to Ross, there were no grounds at all 
to even raise the issue of a waiver. As there was a total absence of 
urgency, the opportunity afforded the accused to exercise their right to 
counsel was inconsistent with the duty imposed by that right on police. 
In relation to the second duty of police triggered by suspect's indication 
that he wants to exercise his right to counsel, the Supreme Court of 
Canada reiterated their 1987 decision by saying: 
"In my view, the right to counsel also means that, once an 
accused or detained person has asserted that right, the 
police cannot, in any way, compel the detainee or accused 
person to make a decision or participate in a process which 
could ultimately have an adverse effect in the conduct of 
an eventual trial until that person has had a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise that right. 11 
The Crown submitted that police had a matter of urgency on their hands in 
regard to the line-up. It is important to conduct such a process as soon 
as possible while impressions are fresh in the minds of witnesses. The 
Court responded that a delay of a few hours could not have hindered the 
police objectives other than the accused being told by their counsel that 
they were under no legal obligation to participate in this identification 
process. A suspect must exercise his right to counsel with due diligence 
and any deliberate maneuvers to use it to obstruct or unnecessarily delay 
the police investigative process is excessive of that right. However, in 
this case, there had not been a reasonable opportunity to exercise the 
right. Consequently, the "due diligence" question on the part of the 
accused could not be a valid issue. 
*R. v. COLLINS [1987] I.S.C.R. 265. 
Also see Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
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Was the identification evidence resulting from the line-up 11 obtained in a 
manner that infringed or denied rights guaranteed by the Charter? 11 The 
Court held that the infringement of the accused right to counsel and the 
evidence were not remote. In fact, it was decided that there was a direct 
link between the two. This left the question whether admitting the 
evidence could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In 
1987*, the Court held that this question had three factors: 
1. Would admitting the evidence render the tria l process unfair; 
2. The seriousness of the Charter violation; 
3. Would excluding the evidence, or more particularly, would 
admission or exclusion better serve the reputation of the justice system? 
The Court held that participating in a identification parade results in 
11 real evidence. 11 Whether an identification was made or not is real and 
distinct from an admissions or confessions in terms of evidence. It i s 
evidence that does not emanate from the suspect and is obtainable without 
his cooperation 11 inasmuch as a person's characteristics exist irrespective 
of any Charter violation or of any steps taken by the police. 11 However, • 
• . nonetheless •.. identification evidence obtained by an 
identification parade is not simply "pre-existing real evidence. 11 (See 
Collins.) The purpose of a line-up is not only to identify the suspect as 
the author of the crime under investigation, but also, with painstaking 
precautions, to render the line-up to be fair, to strengthen the 
credibility of the identification that may result from witnesses viewing 
persons of similar age, sex and appearance. Needless to say, without the 
suspect's cooperation, such a line-up is impossible. Consequently, the 
accused did not participate in obtaining the "real evidence 11 of the 
witnesses identifying them as the perpetrators, but did participate in 
enhancing the weightiness of that evidence by rendering the identification 
credible. Therefore: 
"An accused who is told to participate in a line-up before 
having had a reasonable opportunity to communicate with 
counsel is conscripted against himself, since he is used as 
creating evidence for the purpose of the trial." 
Hence, the credible identification evidence against these accused could 
not have been obtained without their participation which they were under 
no legal obligation to render. 
The admission of the identification evidence would therefore bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
*R. v. COLLINS - Supra 
Accused appeal allowed. 
New trial ordered. 
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Co11111ent: Some aspects of these reasons for judgment should be noted. 
There was mention made in this judgment about police not 
advising the two accused that they were not legally obliged to 
participate in the line-up. After finding that due to their 
failure to contact counsel, the accused were ignorant of their 
legal position, the Court conmented: 11 Nor did the police even 
give them the choice as to whether they should participate. 11 
This must not be seen as a suggestion (as in the U.S. Mirande 
precedent) that police are obliged to make a detained suspect 
aware of all of his rights, but for his right to counsel. In 
this and other judgments, the Courts have indicated that the 
right to counsel is the suspect•s gateway to all that 
information. In the context in which the above quoted statement 
was made by the court, it seems simply an observation of an 
example of the importance of the right to counsel. 
Although it was not a specific issue, the Supreme Court of 
Canada alluded to the question whether a suspect has a positive 
right to refuse to participate in a line-up. It found that 
there are no precedents on this point and observed that there is 
nothing in law that compels a person to participate in an 
identification parade. This, the Court observed, made the role 
of a lawyer so important to decide whether his client should 
participate voluntarily. However, in one case, a detainee 
refused to cooperate in a line-up. He was made to face a 
witness who identified him. Much was made of the fact that 
police had not conducted a proper line-up. In rebuttal, the 
Court got to hear that the accused had refused to participate. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held in that case* that the accused 
was under no obligation to participate, but had exercised the 
right to refuse at his own peril. A lawyer should be aware of 
the prejudicial consequences and how they may be avoided if 
refusal is for cause, e.g., the line-up being unfair in terms of 
dissimilarities of persons in the parade, etc. 
*MARCOUX and SOLOMON v. The Queen [1976] I.S.C.R. 763. 
* * * * * 
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SURREPTICIOUS INSTALLATION OF LISTENING DEVICE -
USE OF POWER FROM BATTERY OWNED BY ACCUSED - LAWFUL INTERCEPTION 
VANWEENAN AND CHESSON v. The Queen 
Supreme Court of Canada - September, 1988 
Vanweenan, Chesson, and others conspired to commit on armed robbery and to 
kidnap someone. Police had obtained an authorization to intercept the 
private communications the accused Chesson had with certain identified 
persons and "persons unknown." Vanweenan was not mentioned in the 
authorization and the Crown depended on the "persons unknown" basket 
clause to have her cummunications admitted in evidence. Vanweenan argued 
that the basket clause in an authorization provides for including persons 
in the authorization, who are at the time of the application unknown to 
police and whose co11111unication may assist the information. At the time of 
the application, Vanweenan was known to police as such a person. The 
court held that the basket clause did not apply to her and her communi-
cations were consequently inadmissible. 
Police, on the strength of the authorization, did place a bugging device 
in Chesson's pick-up truck. The device was connected to the truck's 
battery and drew a minute amount of power that would not have drained the 
battery in 30 days if the truck would not have been used. This, Chesson's 
counsel claimed, amounted to mischief under the Criminal Code and made the 
interception unlawful. Consequently, the communications incepted by this 
device were inadmissible in evidence, he argued. The installing of the 
device was authorized. Even if it was not so specifically, it was 
ancillary to the authorization.* The Supreme Court of Canada held that 
when a judicial authorization empowers police to intercept private 
communications, then it also authorizes. 
"· ••• any person acting under the authorization to enter 
any place at which private communications are to be 
intercepted to install or service a permitted listening 
device ••• provided such entry is required to implement 
the particular authorization ••• unless the authorization 
includes limitations or prohibitions of such entry. A judge in giving an authorization has jurisdiction to 
expressly authorize a person acting under the authorization 
to enter any place at which private communications are to 
be intercepted to install or service a device, provided 
such entry is required to implement the particular 
authorization." 
The Court rejected the claim of mischief and unlawfulness and held that 
the communications of persons included in the authorization, either 
specifically or by means of the basket clause, were admissible. 
Chesson's appeal was dismissed 
Vanweenan's appeal was allowed. 
*See Volume 20, page 13 of this publication. 
* * * * * 
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"DANGEROUS SITUATION" INTERFERING WITH CHARTER RIGHT. 
OFFICERS NOT NAMED IN SEARCH WARRANT ASSISTING IN EXECUTING SAME 
STRACHEN and THE QUEEN 
Supreme Court of Canada - December, 1988 
A search warrant did issue for the Strachen home and four officers were 
named to execute the warrant. Two could not attend and by telephone the 
justice, who had issued the warrant, gave permission for two substitutes. 
Police knew there were two registered handguns in the house and two 
officers not named in the warrant went along to assist. 
The officers controlled the situation in the Strachen home quite 
strictly. They encountered two men who did not live there, and questioned 
them. Everyone was apparently made to stay put until the guns were 
located. Two officers named in the warrant found drugs and trafficking 
paraphernalia before Strachen had been given an opportunity to phone his 
lawyer. He had tried, but was told that he could not phone until "matters 
were under control." Upon the finding of the drugs, Strachen was taken to 
police headquarters where he phoned his lawyer one hour and forty minutes 
after the search of his home began. No opportunity had been afforded 
before. A "right to counsel" infringement resulted in an acquittal, but 
the B.C. Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. Strachen appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada on the grounds that (1) the search warrant was 
invalid and the search unreasonable; and (2) his right to counsel had been 
infringed. Consequently, the evidence against him was inadmissible. 
The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that a search warrant under the 
Narcotics Control Act is quite different from the general warrant provided 
for in the Criminal Code. The former has a much wider scope; hence, the 
requirement that these warrants are issued to named officers who are 
responsible for control, conduct and the general scope of the search. 
However, if the named officer! are present during the search, the use of 
unnamed assistants does not invalidate the warrant. Counsel for the 
defence had submitted that the warrant, due to the words, "a peace officer 
named therein" (s. 10(2) Narcotics Control Act) could only name one 
officer for the execution of the warrant. The Court rejected that 
argument also, pointing out that the Interpretation Act stipulates that 
where it is not specifically "indicated that the singular or plural is 
intended, 11 words in the singular include the plural and the plural include 
the singular. However, naming all peace officers of a department or 
branch without identifying them by name is a non-compliance with the Act. 
Whether or not the telephonic amendment of the warrant was valid, the 
Court did not feel obliged to address. Two of the officers originally 
named were at the search and that made the implied question of validity of 
the warrant superfluous. The warrant was properly issued and reasonably 
executed. Consequently, the search was not unreasonable. 
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The Court confirmed that Strachen' s right to counsel had been violated. 
This violation began when police were finished dealing with two male 
visitors and located the guns. At that point, the potentially volatil e 
situation was under control, and Strachen should have been given the 
opportunity to contact counsel as he had previously indicated was his wish 
to do. 
The evidence found was not linked to the infringement of Strachen 1 s right 
to counsel. However, despite the words of s. 24(2) of the Charter which 
seem to only allow exclusion of evidence where it 11 was obtained in a 
manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by thi s 
Charter, 11 the Court held that a causal link between the infringement and 
the discovery of evidence is not essential to consider suppression of 
evidence under this subsection. In other words, the evidence considered 
for exclusion need not be evidence that would not have been discovered if 
it was not for the Charter infringement. That test would be too narrow 
and cause very confusing situations where the Courts \Jould have to split 
hairs to determine if the evidence was indeed derivative of the Charter 
violation. For instance, in this case, the right to counsel infringement 
demonstrates that clearly. Police had a valid authorization to search and 
did not in any way solicit evidence from Strachen. There was an 
unnecessary delay in accommodating him to consult his counsel. That i s 
totally different from other cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada 
on the exclusionary rule due to right to counsel violations.* In those 
cases, the right to counsel had been infringed and subsequently, the 
Police obtained evidence from the accused. The ev idence either emanated 
from him or was discovered as a direct or indirect consequence of what he 
did or said. Imposing a causal requirement for our exclusionary rule 
would force the Courts to determine what role a lawyer could have played 
on the evidence gathering scenario. If none, as in this case, the 
infringement would be harmless. Such reasoning would remove the remedia l 
objective from s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
Said the Supreme Court of Canada: 
11 In my view, all of the pitfalls of causation may be 
avoided by adopting an approach that focuses on the entire 
chain of events during which the Charter viol ation occurred 
and the evidence was obtained." 
The test whether the evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or 
denied any rights, would be to determine "whether a Charter violation 
occurred in the course of obtaining the evidence." What would be 
prominent in this is a temporal link (a link relating to sequence of time 
or to a particular time) between the Charter violation and the discovery 
of the evidence sought to be suppressed. Thi s, of course, particularly so 
*R. v. MANNINEN - Volume 28, page l of this publication. 
R. v. SIMMONS - See page of this Volume. 
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where the two occur in the course of a single transaction. As the wording 
indicates, a temporal link is not a prerequisite but is "prominent." 
There will be many situations where the breach and the discovery of 
evidence will simply be too remote from one another to consider 
exclusion. Applying this test, the Court concluded that the narcotics 
found in Strachen 1 s possession were obtained in a manner that had 
infringed his right to counsel. However, admission of the evidence would 
not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The infringement 
had been one of convenience rather than one designed as a trap to get 
evidence. As a matter of fact, the Court was complimentary of the officer 
who was in charge of the search. He had demonstrated throughout to be 
careful and aware of the limitations of his authority. 
Accused's Appeal dismissed. 
Order for a new trial upheld. 
* * * * * 
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CORRECTION: "RE BAKER AND THE QUEEN" 26 C.C.C.(3d)l23 
- Volume 25, page 1 of this publication. 
PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS 
B.C. EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT ASSUMING 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
Despite being blinded by the setting sun, a Mr. Brown continued to drive. 
Consequently, he struck two young children (brother and sister). One 
died, and the other survived the serious injuries sustained. A 
substantial petition from the community failed to persuade the public 
prosecutor to prefer any charges but careless driving under the B.C. Motor 
Vehicle Act. The parents of the children (the Bakers) then swore an 
information alleging Dangerous and Criminal Negligent driving. The 
Justice of the Peace issued process and compelled Mr. Brown to appear 
before a provincial court judge. The public prosecutor was there also and 
instructed the clerk of the court to make an entry on the record that the 
proceedings be stayed. This effectively stopped the private prosecution 
of Mr. Brown. The parents petitioned the Supreme Court of B.C. and 
challenged the Crown 1 s right to stay their prosecution. It was argued on 
behalf of the informant (Baker) that the section of the Criminal Code 
empowering the Attorney General to enter a stay of proceedings is 
inconsistent with s. 15 of the Charter in as far as "private informations 
and indictments" are concerned. Section 15 is the "equality" section and 
specifically spells out that everyone is equal before and under the law. 
If this Criminal Code provision allows the Attorney General to interfere 
in someone else's (a private) criminal prosecution, then his authority is 
superior to the unfettered right of a citizen to swear an information and 
follow up with prosecution if process does issue. 
The B.C. Supreme Court justice did recognize "that all citizens of this 
country possess (the right) to privately prosecute indictable offences. 11 
He, however, went on to say: 
" ••• once the Attorney General or counsel on his behalf 
intervenes, or for that matter causes informations to be 
sworn, then the counsel appointed on behalf of the Attorney 
General assumes control of the prosecution and that 
counsel 1 s rights are paramount to the private person 1 s or 
his counsel 1 s rights." 
As crime is regarded as a breach of the Queen•s peace, rather than an 
offence against a private person, the Sovereign is the proper person to 
prosecute for all public offences. 
The inequality argument was rejected. In the view of the Supreme Court 
Justice, the section does not refer to equality between the citizen and 
the Attorney General in relation to their respective rights to prosecute 
but between individuals and groups. The Crimina l Code section that 
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authorizes the Attorney General to stay proceedings does not "indicate an 
evenness "of application to individuals or groups. Although the Attorney 
General is a human being, his prerogatives in relation to criminal l aw are 
not the actions of the individual but of the office he holds. The 
citizen's right to prosecute is unfettered but for the right of the 
Attorney General to stay the proceedings. 
Baker Application was dismissed. 
Note: In the synopsis of this case in Volume 25, page l of this 
publication, it is stated: "Had the Crown not laid any charges, 
it would not have been empowered to stay the proceedings. 
However, the Crown had acted and the father's (Baker's) private 
process had been superseded." That statement is erroneous and 
my misconception of the above quoted position of the reasons for judgment. The comments in the Martin's Annual Criminal Code 
(1989) under s. 579 acknowledge that this judgment has 
recognized that the Attorney General has broad powers to 
intervene in private prosecutions. 
One could question if there is any distinction between a peace 
officer and a private citizen, in terms of pursuing a 
prosecution not approved by the Attorney General or his agent. 
If the views of this Supreme Court Justice will prevail, such a 
submission is likely superfluous. There are, however, some 
interesting arguments that can be advanced; not the least of 
these is the propriety of the executive branch of government 
having the sole authority to say who will be prosecuted and who 
not. Over the last decades, political appointments have 
penetrated deeper and deeper into that branch's infra-
structure. There is no blatant indication that the 
prosecutorial services of this branch are not independently 
exercising the Attorney General's discretion. But to determine 
propriety, what appears to be (or what can be) is as urgent as 
what is. The current message is "trust us" and 11 ••• the 
Attorney General is ultimately answerable to the House. 11 It is 
difficult to think that this will assure public confidence that 
the Crown agent's dis~retion is impartially exercised. 
Crown counsel in this "Re Baker and The Queen" case may well 
have been legally correct in the selection of the charge to be 
preferred; furthermore, there is a real need for quality control 
and above all consistency in consideration for prosecutions. To 
add a large number of peace officers to the persons who decide 
whether or not a person shall be prosecuted does not improve 
those requisites. In the B.C., "Access to Justice" report of 
the province ' s Justice Reform Colll'littee, the "Charge Approval 
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process" is discussed (pages 79-81). It is conceded that in 
England and Ontario, the police officers decide if charges will 
be laid. The committee writes that the measures B.C. 
implemented; by having only agents of the Attorney General 
decide if a person shall be prosecuted is envied by those who do 
not have this system. It is therefore recommended that it 
continues, but that an appeal system be implemented to give some 
recourse when they disagree with Crown counsel's decision. 
Emphasizing that the ultimate decision to change must remain 
with the Crown and not the police, the committee recolllilends that 
a Chief Constable or Detachment Commander can appeal Crown 
counsel's decision to Regional or Senior Crown Counsel. The 
former will respond to and advise the officers of the decision. 
If still unresolved, an appeal may be directed to the Assistant 
Deputy Minister and from there to the Deputy Attorney General. 
Needless to say, that this recommended appeal system does not 
address the concern of exclusive control by the executive branch 
of government. 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada published a criminal law 
series study paper in 1981. Despite the authority of the 
Attorney General to enter a stay of proceeding, having been an 
enactment included i n the Criminal Code since 1953-54, and 
despite statute law superseding common law, the Commis s ion wrote (on page 101): 
"The authority of the individual constable to 
investigate crime, to arrest suspects and to lay 
information before a justice of the peace comes from 
the common law and the Criminal Code and must not be 
interfered with by any political or administrative 
person or body." 
The concept of police independence is one "whose roots can be 
traced in judicial utterances in Canada for over one-hundred 
years" said the Commission. It includes the laying of the 
informations. Admittedly, this does not say that the Attorney 
General must follow through with a prosecution. However, 
should the officer or the force prosecute without the Crown 
counsel's approval, then if a stay was entered by the Attorney 
General, the matter may be distinct from that in "Re Baker v. 
The Queen." 
* * * * * 
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HANDCUFFING - ARBITRARY DETENTION 
Regina v. CHAPMAN 
County Court of Vancouver - C.C. 880798 - November, 1988 
Mr. Chapman was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The investigating 
officer made a demand for breath samples and made Chapman aware of his 
rights to counsel. No arrest was effected. Mr. Chapman was handcuffed 
and placed in the cage in the backseat of the patrol car where he was 
left until the officer was ready to leave the scene. (This was 
apparently a very short period of time.) 
The handcuffs were not removed until arrival in the breathalyzer room. 
The accused provided one sample and, upon his request, was permitted to 
speak to his lawyer and then provided the second sample. 
The officer testified that the accused had been very cooperative and that 
there had been no indication at all that he would give any problems or 
would not accompany the officer. However, the handcuffing was a matter 
of routine to prevent hi111 frorn consuming anything that could have 
affected the accuracy of the breath analyses, and security. Furthermore, 
the officer testified that all persons transported in police vehicles are 
handcuffed by his own and, to the best of his knowledge, the Force's 
policy. 
This blanket handcuffing policy applied in this case, caused the 
accused's detention to be arbitrary, contrary to s. 9 of the Charter. 
This infringement of the accused's right not to be so detained had caused 
the trial judge to exclude the evidence of the breath analyses. The 
accused's acquittal of "over 80 mlg 11 was appealed by the Crown. 
The trial judge had responded to the Constable's evidence of the routine 
policy to hancuff anyone he transported, as follows: 
11 It seems, at least in the mind of this Constable, that is 
his policy and he seems to think it is police policy to 
handcuff all persons who are put into a police car. I 
cannot see that at all. It is demeaning to the individual, 
particularly where that individual, and it seems pretty 
clear in this case, was being thoroughly cooperative." 
The police policy to handcuff anyone who is detained is arbitrary reasoned 
the Appeal Court Judge. However, there was no link (no pun intended) 
between the detention and the handcuffing. Mr. Chapman was already 
detained when the handcuffs were put on him and that did not change the 
status of the detention. The detention itself was not arbitrary when it 
conrnenced with the demand nor was it prolonged in anyway by the 
handcuffing. When the cuffs were put on, Chapman was detained, and he 
still was when they were removed. Hence, the arbitrary policy did not 
cause any loss of liberty in terms of time. 
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Conc l uded the Appeal Court: 
11 ! have thus concluded that there was not an arbitrary 
detention, and in so deciding, I make no comment on this . 
particular blanket policy of the police, and iven certain 
fact patterns, it well could result in a Charter via ation 
and a subseguent rejection of evidence obtained thereafter. 11 
(Emphasis is mine.) 
* * * * * 
Crown' s appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
- 40 -
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITH 
EIGHT MINUTES TO GO ON TWO-HOUR LIMIT 
Regina v. STREET 
County Court of Vancouver - C.C. 871810 - February, 1989 
At 12:55 A.M., the accused was involved in a one-car accident and was 
taken to hospital to be treated for minor injuries. Consequently, the 
accused, who was under demand for breath samples, did not arrive at the 
police station until 2:25 A.M. From 2:33 till 2:44 A.M., the accused was 
left alone with the yellow pages and a phone. He was then told that due 
to the two-hour time limit, there was some urgency for him to get on with 
whatever he was doing. The accused said, "No, I'm going to call ••.• " 
and he mentioned a name. However, according to the officer, the accused just continued to sit motionless in his chair, staring at the telephone 
book. In view of the accused's stated intent, the officer observed the 
accused for two minutes and as there was no change in his posture and no 
indication of any kind that he was to carry out that intent, the officer 
told him that his failure "to approach" the breathalyzer was taken as a 
refusal. The accused was convicted accordingly and now appealed claiming 
that is right to counsel had been infringed. 
In the officer's testimony, he identified the critical time for the first 
sample of breath to be 2:45 A.M., and he informed the accused that he took 
his non-action as a refusal at 2:46 A.M. There could not have been a 
matter of urgency at that time. The demand was still binding on the 
accused, and the results of breath analyses after the two-hour limit are 
still admissible in evidence. The only thing the Crown loses is the 
advantage of the presumption of equalization. There was no evidence what 
the accused did in the eleven minutes when he was alone with the phone 
book and the phone, and the trial judge had found as a fact that the 
accused had not deliberately been stalling. 
Due to the short period of time within the two-hour limit afforded the 
accused to exercise his right to counsel, some assistance should have been 
given to him. If counsel had been contacted, there would have been 
sufficient time to clarify the accused's position and take the samples. 
Appeal allowed 
Conviction quashed 
Note: This is the second B. C. case where something was made of g1v1ng 
a detainee the yellow pages of the phone book only at a time when 
all offices are likely closed. In both cases, this was of some 
weight in determining if the right to counsel had been violated. 
There is also some indication in these reasons for judgment that 
had the trial judge found as a fact that the accused had been 
stalling, then there would not have been a violation of the 
accused's right to counsel. 
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DEFENCE DEMANDING A REPRESENTATIVE AMPOULE 
AND SAMPLE OF ALCOHOL SOLUTION 
FOR PRIVATE ANALYSES TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY 
HODGSON v. The Queen 
County Court of Vancouver - C.C. 880198 - January, 1989. 
The manufacturers of the approved Borkenstein breathalyzers certify the 
accuracy of their instruments providing the exact specifications are met. 
No responsibility is assumed by the manufacturer unless genuine 
breathalyzer ampoules are used. To test the accuracy, an alcohol solution 
is used and, needless to say, the validity of that test depends on the 
solution being suitable. 
Prior to the Charter coming into effect (in 1972) a party by the name of 
Duke* appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada claiming he had been 
deprived of a fair trial as guaranteed under the Bill of Rights (1960). 
This argument was based on the fact that the police could not provide him 
with a sample of the breath he provided for the purpose of analysis. The 
Crown had used the analysis to convict him of "over 08." Without Duke 
having an equal opportunity to analyze that breath and assure himself of 
the accuracy of the police analysis, his trial was unfair. The Crown had 
simply failed to provide him with evidence for the purpose of his defence. 
The Supreme Court of Canada had responded that such failure does not 
deprive the accused of a fair trial. A fair trial means that it is 
public, without bias, and with judicial impartiality. The la~ did not 
provide for Duke to have such a sample and the Crown's inability to 
provide it is irrelevant to the fairness of the trial. 
In the post-Charter days (1983) a party by the name of Potma** took a 
similar plight to the Ontario Court of Appeal because the Crown had 
refused to supply a representative ampoule used to analyze her breath 
samples which caused her conviction for "over 08"." The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that the Charter had not changed anything relevant to the issue. 
Both the Bill or Rights and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantee a 
fair trial based on the principles of fundamental justice. Hence, the 
decision made in the Duke case still stood despite the Charter. 
In 1985***, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of the 
distinction between the Bill of Rights and its guarantee that the 
principles of fundamental justice will be applied to our "right to a fair 
hearing" and the Charter pledging that those principles are fundamental to 
* Duke v. The Queen - (1972) 7 C.C.C.(2nd)474 
** R. v. POTMA {1983) 18 M.V.R. 133. 
***Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) 
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any consideration in regard to deprivation of life, liberty and the 
security of our person. Needless to say, the latter entrenched pledge is 
far broader than the narrow assurance of a fair trial in the Bill of 
Rights. Consequently, the Duke decision is no longer an exhaustive 
guidance. 
In Saskatchewan, the Crown refused to supply a representative ampoule 
while it was conceded that the police still had ampoules available of that 
lot number. In 1987, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal* based on the 
precedent explained above, held that the Crown by its refusal had violated 
the accused person's right not to be deprived of liberty other than in 
accordance to the principles of fundamental justice. That it was such a 
violation, the Court su11111ed up as follows: 
1. The Crown was in a position to supply the ampoule at the time the 
request was made and did not do so; 
2. The defence request was sincere and not some delay tactic or 
grasping for straws; 
3. The Crown has, despite the adversary mode of trial, a fact 
finding function; 
4. Supplying the ampoul e would have been within the Crown's (or 
Court's) obligation to disclose to the accused the essential 
material it relied on to meet its burden of proof. 
The sections of the Criminal Code allowing the certificate of analyses to 
be proof of its content and its presumption of equalization (that the 
blood/alcohol level at the time of analyses is equal to that at the time 
of driving) are evidentiary short-cuts. Therefore, the observance of s. 7 
of the Charter in issues like these must be diligent. 
In another B.C. case (Provincial Court) defence counsel requested a 
representative sample of the standard alcohol solution used to test the 
accuracy of the breathalyzer in preparation for analyzing his client's 
breath. At the time the letter reached Crown counsel, the police still 
had such solution for that lot. However, a week's delay in Crown 
counsel's office caused inability to supply the sample. The ability to 
supply the ampoule and failing to do so had amounted to a violation of the 
accused's right (s. 7 of the Charter). In another case, the trial judge 
went as far as to say that no supply of ampoules or alcohol solution 
should be exhausted until the prosecutions of the persons who are charged 
as a consequence of analyses in which these substances were used, had been 
concluded. 
* R. v. BOURGET (1987) 35 C.C.C. (3d) 371. 
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Then the B.C. pendulum started to swing the other way when the B.C. Court 
of Appeal rendered reasons for judgment in 1987* on whether the "packet" 
content upon which a judicial authorization to intercept private 
communications did issue, should be disclosed to the defence. (In 
Ontario, access to the packet content is a matter of right.) The Court 
held that there is a right of access to the information providing the 
defence can show that the authorization was obtained fraudulently by means 
of deliberate non-disclosure, or that the packet contains information that 
may assist directly in shedding at least a reasonable doubt about guilt. 
Disclosing the packet content as of right will only be a license for a 
fishing expedition to find some flaw that may trigger the strict 
exclusionary rule contained in the Privacy Laws. Where the issue is not 
one of guilt or innocence in some direct way, there is not constitutional 
protection. 
Said the B.C. Court of Appeal: 
" •••• in relation to the matter in issue, here the 
approach taken in Potma remains valid •••• " (see above) 
In view of all this, the County Court Judge held that the question is 
whether the accused Hodgson, having been denied the opportunity of having 
a representative sample of the substances independently tested, had been 
deprived of his right to make a full answer and defence. 
Absent a bare refusal to provide such samples, the Potma decision remains 
valid. However, a 11mere non-production does not necessarily infringe the 
right to a fair trial in accordance with fundamental justice." · 
The request for the samples was akin to the Dersch, et!.!. request to have 
the content of the packet disclosed to them. The suitability of the 
substances was not a live issue as no suggestion or foundation was laid 
that there may have been some defect. The request seemed to be made on 
the off-chance that some flaw may be discovered. For this kind of 
disclosure, some evidence that is a possibility of a defect is 
prerequisite held the Court. Any doubt at all about suitability does 
shift the burden to prove such is to the Crown. The accused had failed to 
show anything relevant to the substances. 
"In the event I am wrong," reasoned the Appeal Court Judge, and the 
failure to supply the substances to the accused amounted to a violation of 
his Charter right under s. 7, admission of the certificate of analyses 
will not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction for "over 08" upheld 
*Re Regina v. DERSCH, et al (1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 435. 
Also see Volume 31, page 23, of this publication. 
* * * * * 
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ATTEMPTED MURDER AND HIT AND RUN 
MEANING OF 11 ACCIDENT 11 - ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENT 
Regina v. HANSEN 
B.C. Court of Appeal - No. C.A. V00488, Victoria, BC, December, 1988 
The accused struck a pedestrian with his car and left the scene without 
identifying himself. As the person he struck was the estranged husband of 
the woman the accused was intimately involved with, he was not only 
charged with hit and run under the Criminal Code of Canada but also with 
attempting to co11111it murder. A jury returned verdicts of guilty on both 
counts. The accused appealed. 
The accused had testified and told the jury that it was all an accident . 
He had not intended to strike the victim with his car. He had simply 
panicked when it did happen and had fled the scene. The car he drove was 
a LI-drive and he had explained the damage to the owner by saying that he 
struck a deer. The victim, the estranged husband, also testified. Where 
the Crown had attempted to show that there was animosity between the two 
men, he said he hardly knew the accused. The fact that the victim had 
damaged the accused's parked car two days prior to him suffering two 
broken legs from the accused running him over, had also been a mere 
coincidence. 
When police questioned the accused for two hours, he had been tenacious 
and adamant in not making a statement or to give any explanations. The 
taped conversation with the investigating officers contained no less than 
24 explicit refusals by the accused to explain anything. He did, however, 
imply that there was something that needed explaining but said: 11 I 1 1l 
make up the statement at another point 1n time. 11 The officers urged the 
accused to explain things now. They pointed out to him that no 
explanation or a delayed one would be adverse to his interest. The former 
would imply guilt and the latter concoction. However, the accused 
persisted not to give any explanations. This two-hour conversation was 
transcribed and was admitted in evidence as a voluntary statement. 
The exercise of the right to remain silent may (with a few exceptions) not 
result in a jury drawing inferences adverse to the accused. A trial judge 
must instruct a jury on this point. Therefore, the police version of the 
consequences of not explaining the accident were erroneous. Furthermore, 
the jury was not instructed on how to deal with the accused's refusal to 
explain. This meant that this voluntary statement, with little probative 
value had been very prejudicial to the accused. The B.C. Court of Appeal 
held that the admission of the statement had violated the principles of 
fundamental justice and would bring disrepute on the administration of justice. 
In relation to the attempted murder 
conviction, the appeal was allowed 
and a new trial was ordered. 
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The accused also appealed his conviction of Hit and Run. The Crown 
alleged that he left the scene of an "accident." Arising from the same 
facts, they alleged attempted murder which requires the specific intent to 
take someone's life. That made the act of running down the pedestrian not 
an accidental but a deliberate one. The Crown wanted to have its cake and 
eat it too. An accident is an unexpected occurrence that produces hurt or 
loss. 
Reviewing cases on this point decided in the U.S. and Canada*, the B.C. 
Court of Appeal concluded: 
11 In summary, s. 236 must be construed to include both 
intentional and unintentional striking by a motor vehic le 
of a person. " 
Appeal re conviction of Hit and Run 
Dismissed. 
*R. v. STREET (1971)5 C.C.C. (2d) 232. 
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LEGAL TID BITS 
ROADSIDE BREATH TEST - DETENTION - RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Thomsen was demanded to give a roadside breath sample. He bluntly refused 
several times while sitting in the police cruiser. He was there upon the 
instructions of the officer. He was released and charged accordingly. At 
no time was he told of his rights to counsel. The Supreme Court of Canada 
held that Thomsen's right to counsel was infringed while he was detained. 
However, to have a person contact counsel when demanded a roadside breath 
sample is totally impractical and would render the legislation useless. 
Consequently, the legislation, by implication, creates an exemption to the 
right to counsel. This exemption was therefore "prescribed by lawu and is 
inconsistent with the Charter ••• unless demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society •.• (s. 1 Charter). In view of the 
devastation caused by drinking drivers and the perceived risk of getting 
caught being enhanced by this enactment, it is justified. Accused's 
appeal dismissed. 
THOMSEN v. The Queen - April, 1988 - Supreme Court of Canada. 
* * * * * 
CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON 
The accused was, in the evening, standing near a pub. He was seen to 
adjust his clothing and was consequently searched. A knife was found near 
the small of his back, concealed by his pants and shirt. He explained he 
wanted to keep the knife away from a friend and had no intention to use it 
as a weapon. The trial judge rejected this explanation and convicted the 
accused of carrying a concealed weapon. The accused appealed. The appeal judge, who accepted the trial judge's rejection of the accused's 
explanation, had to decide whether the concealed knife was "used or 
intended to be used as a weapon" (definition of weapon C.C.). Having 
regard to the time and place and to the manner in which the knife was 
carried, it had to be established as a fact that the sole purpose of it 
was to provide a weapon to the bearer. Applying this test, the Court 
concluded that it was a rational inference that the knife was not carried 
for an innocent purpose. 
Accused appeal dismissed. 
Regina v. HORSEFALL - County Court of Vancouver -
C.C. 88137, January, 1989. 
* * * * * 
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IS USE OF A "DIAL NUMBER RECORDER" 
AN INTERCEPTION OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATION? 
For whatever reason (probably to prove association) the police were 
interested, as part of their investigation, to learn who two parties 
(H & G) phoned. To install a "Dial Number Recorder" and connect it to 
the police telephone line, police required "facility information" from 
the telephone company. For this purpose, a search warrant was executed 
and a police technician hooked up the necessary connections. Police 
recorded for a period of time the dates, times and numbers dialed from 
those two telephones. Neither the origin of incoming calls were 
recorded, nor was any conversation intercepted. The spreadsheet of thes e 
calls was sought to be admitted in evidence. The defence objected and 
claimed that the information about the calls was included in the Privacy 
provisions of the Criminal Code and required an authorization to 
intercept. To back up his arguments, the defence showed how the 
telephone system can be used to communicate without conversation by means 
of arranged signals (letting the phone ring a certain number of times or 
placing a person to person call for a certain party). He also 
successfully used the definition of private communication in the Criminal 
Code 11 • • • or any te 1 ecommun i cat ion made under circumstances . • . " 
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In addition, the 
Interpretation Act defines telecommunication to mean any transmission 
" •.• of sign5, images, sounds, or intelligence of !!!l nature by means 
of wire or radio .•• " This convinced the trial judge to hold that the 
police had intercepted private communication by means of the Dial Number 
Recorder and had required a judicial authorization to intercept the 
signals caused by dialing. Consequently, the evidence was excluded. 
Regina v. GRIFFITH - Ontario District Court - 44 C.C.C.(3d)63. 
* * * * * 
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POSSESSION OF GOODS OBTAINED BY CRIME 
To defraud the insurance company, S. arranged for D. to conduct a fake 
break-in of his home. Subsequently, various valuable items were taken to 
D.'s home to be stored there until S. could sell them. S. phoned the 
accused EPP and offered him his stereo equipment for $800.00. With the 
full knowledge of the insurance rip-off, the accused bought the 
equipment. Consequently, the accused was convicted of "possession of 
property obtained by the commission of an offence." He appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal submitting that the insurance company 
discovered the fraud before it paid anything to S.; he (the accused) had 
no part whatsoever in the scheme and did not become aware of the false 
claim until after the fake break-in (but before buying the equipment); 
when he did purchase the equipment, it was the property of S. and only 
part of (but not the proceeds of) an attempt to defraud. Hence, the 
property was not directly or indirectly obtained by means of an offence. 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the circumstances did not bring the 
accused within the purview of s. 312 C.C. Acquittal was substituted for 
the conviction. 
Regina v. EPP - 42 C.C.C.(3d)572. 
* * * * * 
WHEN ATTACKING A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, THERE ARE AS MANY ROBBERIES 
AS THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO SURRENDERED ANYTHING BECAUSE OF BEING 
SUBJECTED TO VIOLENCE OR THREATS OF VIOLENCE. 
The accused et al were convicted of three counts of armed robbery arising 
from one vislt to a Credit Union. Three tellers were robbed and the 
money obtained was stolen from the Credit Union. The theft was from one 
institution and not from the robbed tellers. After all, robbery is theft 
involving violence or threats of violence. One of the accused appealed 
to the B.C. Court of Appeal, and argued that in view of there being one 
action against the institution and one theft, there should only be one 
conviction for robbery. The Court was not persuaded. Not the Credit 
Union, but three separate persons were robbed, and therefore, the three 
convictions were proper. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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INFERENCE TO BE DRAWN FROM TAKING FLIGHT 
The accused weaved and drove at times on the wrong side of the road. 
When police tried to stop him, he sped away, again on the wrong side of 
the road. This maneuver was obviously an attempt to escape being spoken 
to by police. When finally apprehended, the accused resisted arrest, and 
the officer subdued him by hitting him across the thighs with his night 
stick. The accused was acquitted of failing to blow. Due to the violent 
overreaction of the officer, his refusal was reasonable reasoned the 
trial judge. It had caused fear of prejudice. He was, however, 
convicted of impaired driving. Thus, the accused appealed claiming that 
the evidence was no more then some observation of erratic driving and 
smell of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. The Vancouver County Court 
agreed with the trial judge's finding of the fact that the accused 
displayed all symptoms of impairment, when linked with his obvious 
attempt to flee justified the conviction. The aggregate of the driving, 
the symptoms, the fleeing, and the resistance to arrest amounted to proof 
beyond a rasonable doubt. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Regina v. TOMKO - Vancouver County Court -
C.C. 881622 - January, 1989. 
* * * * * 





